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INTRODUCTION

Yogi Berra is attributed with saying, "You can observe a lot by just watching."' This Article seeks to "re-watch" the centuries old American debate-should judges be elected or appointed-and "observe" that it largely may have been asking the wrong question.
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged,
The desirability of judicial elections is a question that has sparked disagreement for more than 200 years. Hamilton believed that appointing judges to positions with life tenure constituted "the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws." Jefferson thought that making judges "dependent on none but themselves" ran counter to the principle of "a government founded on the public will."
2
The debate over how judges are selected is a robust one and continues today in decisional law and academic literature. The focus is primarily on elections. What is the impact, both on voters and on judicial behavior, of money? Of campaigning based on issues the judge might rule upon? Of aggressive advertising? Of partisan affiliation? Are judicial elections different from other elections? Should they be?
The underlying narrative is one about what contemporary theorists call "legitimacy." Essential to a functioning democracy is a judicial function seen as legitimate-meaning it is trusted even when it rules in controversial or unpopular ways.
The thesis of this Article is that engaging in the debate over how judges should be selected is more important now than ever, but that what has emerged so far is a chaotic and contradictory data set. The solution to this apparent Gordian knot is to shift focus to an earlier process juncture-being precise, objective, apolitical, and unforgiving in screening who is qualified to be considered to be ajudge.
The stakes today are higher than they have ever been. Over two centuries ago, Hamilton and Jefferson had a conversation about balancing the values of democracy and justice. What is the more important system value-an accountable judge or an independent judge? The conundrum goes to the essence of what a judiciary should be in a democracy. Can we trust ajudge who has to answer to the people? Can we trust a judge who does not have to answer to the people?' And contemporaneously with addressing that philosophical riddle, the Founders embedded in the Constitution a thrice-memorialized democratic check on potentially autocratic judges-the jury. 4 But today the jury has all but disappeared:
J] uries hear . .. around one to four percent of criminal cases in federal and state courts and hear less than one percent of civil cases in federal and state courts.... Even when juries hear cases, judges often second-guess them, taking cases from them using procedures that did not exist at the time of the founding.'
So today the manner ofjudicial selection often is the only democratic check on potentially autocratic power in the judicial branch. Little clarity has come from the academic and judicial focus on whether-and if so, how-judges should be elected. Much study has been given to the impact on the perceived legitimacy of the courts from electing judges. Much study has looked at the increased politicization of the judicial appointment process. And read collectively, the body of work approaches being oxymoronic.
That is not to say that the work is flawed. Rather, correctlystructured study of whether legitimacy is enhanced by electing or appointing judges should not come to a clear answer if it turns out that picking one manner ofjudicial selection or the other does not materially matter to balancing democracy, justice, and legitimacy.
There is a recent anecdotal case study concretely illustrating precisely that-that the manner of judicial selection in fact may Judicial appointments have a significant apolitical, meritselection component. Persons interested in becoming a judge apply to the Governor's appointments office." Applications go through extensive review by the State Bar of California's Judicial Nomination Evaluation Commission.1 2 The Governor nominates a person who survives that evaluation.
1 3 And then the nominee is subject to legislative advice and consent. 4 The California approach is an intricate one intended to produce a professional, qualified-in other words, a neutral and independent-judiciary through a democratic process. Sometimes judges are opposed; sometimes a judicial seat is "open," with no incumbent on the ballot; and, sometimes an incumbent does lose. But even that process does not always lead to a perception ofjudicial legitimacy.
Brock Turner, a former freshman swimmer at Stanford, was convicted of three counts of sexual assault.' 5 Turner digitally 6. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. 17 adjudicated the sentencing hearing of Brock Turner. Judge Persky-weighing among other evidence a victim impact statement that had "gone viral" as a moving description of the consequences of rape," countered by a defense statement by Turner's father describing the rape conviction as "a steep price to pay for 20 minutes of action out of his 20 plus years of life"' 9 -sentenced Turner to six months in jail, citing the "extraordinary circumstances" of Turner's youth and lack of criminal record. 20 Public response could be charitably described as an explosion. A petition drive began to impeach Judge Persky. 2 1 The California legislature passed a law to prohibit similarly "light" sentences in the future. 2 2 Judge Persky was "voluntarily" reassigned to only civil cases.
judicial Selection in the States
23 A formal recall campaign began. 24 The saga seemed to come to a close when, on December 19, 2016, the California Commission onJudicial Performance concluded there was no evidence thatJudge Persky displayed bias or was otherwise guilty ofjudicial misconduct warranting discipline. 25 But, onJanuary 23, 2018, the County of Santa 26 In that election, voters did in fact recall Judge Persky (the first California judge to be successfully recalled in eighty-six years).27
The underlying, unspoken narrative of Judge Persky's public excoriation seemed to be one of a community frustrated that it could not easily, immediately, and effectively punishJudge Persky. That is a frustration with some irony. Judge Persky stood for reelection just six days after handing down the Brock Turner sentence. 28 But the ballot had long been closed, andJudge Persky was unopposed." That left the public with less obvious options to respond to what was generally perceived as a failure of justice.
Judge Persky administered justice as he saw it, but in a deeply unpopular way. Ultimately, he lost his job.
3 o He suffered consequences which could influence, by way of example, the judicial decision-making of otherjudges.
3 ' Aspects of this saga reflected both judicial independence and judicial accountability. So, is this an example of a broken system or one behaving as it should?
2 No matter where one stands on the election-or-appointment divide, or the independence-or-accountability divide, the Judge Persky saga is frustrating. How could he have thought this was acceptable? Who are we to second-guess a conclusion having not , https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-dangerous-misguided-campaign-to-recallthejudge-who-sentenced-brock-turner.html?via=recircrecent (arguing that the recall of Judge Persky may have been well-intentioned, but could pressure judges to play it safe by sentencing others harshly).
32. One must be careful to not overinterpret the example. For instance, perhaps the "dilemma" ofJudge Persky reflects biases turning on gender and privilege. Consider the contrast of the reaction to the Brock Turner sentencing with The Times newspaper in London reporting positively on the likelihood that a female Oxford student aspiring to be a heart surgeon might be spared anyjail time for stabbing her boyfriend in the leg. Frances Gibb &Jonathan Ames, 'Extraordinary' Student Could Be Sparedjailfor Stabbing Boyfriend, THE TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/extraordinary-student-couldbe-spared-jail-for-stabbing-boyfriend-jmvb372vm.
seen the full set of evidence and witnesses? If he was still a fully qualified judge, then why did he have to abandon presiding over criminal trials? What the story of Judge Persky seems to illustrate is that the way one thinks about judges, elections, appointments, and removal neither creates consensus nor even progress toward a satisfactory solution.
ProfessorJames L. Gibson writes, "When people know that they have the power to turn out judges who perform poorly, they are more willing to accept the decisions of those judges."
3 But as the Brock Turner saga exposes, people often do not actually have the power to turn out judges who perform poorly, at least not easily, which makes people angry.
Further, if the end goal is legitimacy, then the "willingness" Gibson describes is emblematic of illegitimacy, not of legitimacy. The central tenet of "Legitimacy Theory" is that a legitimate institution enjoys support even when society disagrees with the institution's specific acts. What then is the lesson of the provocative example of the Brock Turner trial and the public reaction to its presiding judge, Aaron Persky? One explanation is that a methodology of judicial selection-even an intricate, thoughtful, hybrid method-is not what infuses a judiciary with legitimacy. In other words, the current literature on judicial selection-which is almost entirely focused on choosing between judicial election or judicial appointment-may frame a debate incapable of resolution.
This Article revisits the extant literature on judicial selection and legitimacy, and proposes an alternative interpretation. This Article proposes that what the literature consistently describes is an institution that' needs to derive legitimacy at a different process juncture-determining who is eligible to be a judge. Selecting among an extant list of possible judges-and debating the manner of selection-is a step too late.
The solution proposed by this Article is that any judicial aspirant be screened by a civil-service-like, objective merit system. Political processes would be limited to then selecting a judge from the list of qualified candidates that emerge. The idea is to not focus on who precisely Judge Persky is and what precisely he did (or on any other individual judge or decision), but to focus on a requirement that any judge must, by definition, be found appropriately and exceptionally qualified as determined by an apolitical system. Then, perhaps, a community might react to a result such as the sentence of Brock Turner by recognizing that the judge perhaps knew something that the press did not report, and accepting that decision. That is legitimacy.
Part I of this Article reviews the extant literature on the role in a democracy of legitimacy in general, and judicial legitimacy specifically. Part II addresses the literature on the conflicting goals ofjudicial accountability andjudicial independence, which paints a confounding picture of the impact ofjudicial selection methods in serving either or both goals. Part III offers a reinterpretation of the judicial selection literature, proposing that it consistently describes a different solution-a more aggressive merit screening of judicial aspirants. And Part IV seeks to untie the apparent Gordian knot of removing politics from judicial selection while retaining a democratic element in the judicial branch.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, JUDICIAL SELECTION, AND LEGITIMACY
A. Democracy
In the book, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval Harari describes how humans have overcome the limitations of small clans of individuals by adopting the construct of "common myths that exist only in [human] imagination."" Harari argues that these common myths are the basis of almost all recorded human history, beginning with the agricultural revolution and threading through the development of religion and economic systems and government.
True democracy itself is one such "common myth." For much of human history, the dominant organizing principle in world governance was "might makes right." As Thomas Hobbes put it, life is "nasty, brutish, and short." 3 6 Sheer power-the threat to one's continued corporeal existence and the avoidance of pain and suffering-undoubtedly was an effective method to enforce adherence to shared myths, such as the infallibility and supremacy of a monarch.
In his book, The Cave and the Light, Arthur Herman traces the gradual emergence of the view that rulers do not properly derive power from force of arms, but from the people, who both may chose and remove rulers.? The idea began with William Ockham, was part of the philosophical underpinning of the "Catholic Schism" (the only instance before recent times when a Pope voluntarily relinquished office), was famously developed by John Locke, and was memorialized by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence.?
While the great western philosophers of the Renaissance disagreed about whether "common myth" advanced or hindered individual rights, all saw it as the only option in the absence of governance through force. Thomas Aquinas and his followers posited that in the natural state, man was totally free and utterly unsafe. Thinkers such as Hobbes saw government as existing to regulate brutishness-an agreement to trade some degree of natural rights for some degree of civil rights. 3 John Locke argued that liberty was protected, not hindered, by the social contract: proper government was not a restraint on natural liberty, but an expansion of it by providing a framework for protecting and nurturing it. In the view of Locke, therefore, government by popular consent was "what separates a society of free men from a society of slaves."" When Ithe North American British Colonies declared independence from the Crown-not long after the death of Locke-modern democracy, a form of government explicitly based on social contract, was born. The second sentence of the Declaration of Independence asserted, "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving theirjust powers from the consent of the governed. .. . "" The Declaration of Independence rejected "might makes right," explicitly adopting a principle of shared, voluntary self-governance. Democracy is, of course, a myth. It is a collective acceptance among dispersed strangers-most of whom will never have occasion to communicate with each other even once-that they will somehow believe and accept an amorphously-identified common intention and accord their individual conduct within a presumed, but never actually negotiated, social contract.
B. judicial Selection and judicial Legitimacy in Democracies
Early on, the Founders of the United States saw the connection between, and conundrum of, democracy and how individuals got to be judges. As Stephen Croley summarizes, In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that permanence of tenure, which he considered to be a great virtue of the proposed federal judiciary, would avoid many ills associated with subjecting judges to political pressures. According to Hamilton, an independentjudiciary constituted the "citadel of the public justice and the public security." His argument is uncompromising:
"Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to [the judiciary's] necessary independence." Half of a century later, Alexis de Tocqueville joined Hamilton by suggesting that some states' then-emergent practice of subjecting judges to periodic elections was tantamount to an attack on "the democratic republic itself." 42 Yet, as quoted above, Jefferson thought that making judges "dependent on none but themselves" ran counter to the principle of "government founded on the public will." A free society, accustomed to electing its rulers, does not much care whether the rulers operate through statute and executive order, or through judicial distortion of statute, executive order, and constitution. The prescription that judges be elected probably springs from the people's realization that their judges can become their rulers-and (it must be said) from just a deep-down feeling that members of the Third Branch will profit from a hearty helping of humble pie, and from a severe reduction of their great remove from the (ugh!) People. Academics and philosophers chew on the same concepts. Aristotle's Rhetoric describes the three modes of persuasion as logos, ethos, and pathos. 4 7 Logos is an appeal based on logic. 48 Ethos is an appeal based on the credibility of the speaker. 4 9 Pathos is an appeal based on emotion." Contemporary social scientists, beginning with David Easton, implicitly describe how a nonviolent society requires its institutions have all three-logos, ethos, and pathos. This is a conversation about legitimacy. Easton describes "the inculcation of a sense of legitimacy" as "probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor both of the authorities and of the regime. "51 Easton posits the question whether a political system could survive without "feelings of legitimacy," and answers that such convictions are "helpful and perhaps even necessary."
52
If the constant threat of living on a precipice of disorder is to be avoided, at a minimum the authorities require some assurance .. Easton's work introduced the label of "Legitimacy Theory," or that which "gives explicit consideration to the expectations of society ... and [to] whether an organization appears to be complying with the expectations of the societies within which it operates." 54 Institutions with diffuse, rather than specific, support are said to be legitimate, meaning the institution enjoys support even when society disagrees with the institution's specific acts.
5
Harari, Easton, Herman, Locke, Scalia, Ginsburg, De Tocqueville, Hamilton, Jefferson, and scores of others all grasp the same core concept: legitimacy-including judicial legitimacy-is essential to democracy. An acceptance of a government institution-including its courts-acting in a way a constituent disagrees with is the glue of a healthy, nonviolent, democratic society.
C. Legitimacy and the judiciary in Democracies
The U.S. Supreme Court from time to time explicitly acknowledges the centrality of legitimacy to the judiciary's own viability and the sometimes ill-fitting relationship between legitimacy, democracy, and the judiciary. In Taylor 58 justice Stevens famously wrote that the opinion undermined the "public treasure" of "the public's confidence in the Court itself" and thus "was a wound that may harm ... the Nation." that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. Scholars agree. Leslie Ellis and Shari Siedman Diamond, summarizing the work of several social scientists, wrote,
[P]eople are more willing to accept decisions and to adhere to agreements over time when they perceive those decisions as having been produced by fair procedures. Moreover, the authority and perceived legitimacy of the institutions that produce the decisions are enhanced when the procedures used to produce the decisions are viewed as fair, even when those decisions involved unfavorable outcomes. The comfort and positive reactions of litigants are of course important in and of themselves. But building perceptions of-procedural justice has an additional important payoff: enhanced authority and legitimacy increase the likelihood that the parties will accept the jury's finding. The more legitimate the process is perceived to be, the more likely participants are to accept the outcome, positive or negative. 
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Or consider one aspect of the political chaos that was North Carolina in 2017.76 In October 2017, following the loss of the executive house, the (majority Republican) North Carolina legislature sought to enact a court reform plan that had been dormant for years. 77 Despite this being squarely within their legislative power, the course of action evoked accusations of political bias due to its timing. Whether or not this was the intent, this is a prime example of the sensitive balance legislatures must consider when taking actions that might affect judicial legitimacy. 78 In the end, the challenge is not identifying the importance of judicial legitimacy to democracy, but identifying how to foster and protect it. 79 As Gibson finds, while the U.S. Supreme Court is one of the most trusted government institutions in the world, even its legitimacy can erode, and "what we do not know ... is whether/why/how/under what conditions changes take place."" Put another way, precisely how-if at all-can one structure a judiciary simultaneously to be accountable, independent, and legitimate in a democracy?
Important in this task is keeping straight the difference between legitimacy and trust. As a general matter, one intuitively trusts judges who make decisions they agree with and mistrustseven seeks to remove-judges who makes decisions they disagree with. But if the judiciary has legitimacy, then one trusts a judge that they disagree with. This is a critical distinction, and one that even legitimacy scholars lose track of from time to time.
II. THE CONFOUNDING LITERATURE ON WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT-JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY (ELECTEDJUDGES) OR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (APPOINTEDJUDGES)-IN A DEMOCRACY
The term "legitimacy" is a recent addition to the conversation weighing accountability and independence, but the conversation has been going on for quite a long time." There is a lot of literature-indirectly and increasingly directly-considering the big question: How can one structure ajudiciary to be accountable, independent, and legitimate in a democracy?
Id.
Major NCJudicial Distict Reshuffling Moves
Any hope that the work has pointed to an answer is misplaced. The work is a mess. As Professor Lee Epstein summarized in 2013, For decades now, many law professors, judges, institutes, and professional associations (including the American Judicature Society), have been leveling an assault on judicial elections. Their attack is multi-pronged but usually the words "special interests," "judicial independence," "impartiality," and "legitimacy" appear somewhere in their articles and speeches, and on their websites. Now the assaulters are under assault. The counter-attackers are mostly social scientists, with a sprinkling of law professors. Armed with vast amounts of data, their point isn't to show that judicial elections aren't as bad as we've been led to believe; it is to demonstrate that forcing judges to face the electorate has substantial benefits." 
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Dimino argues that "the governmental interests in maintaining an independent, impartial judiciary and in protecting the appearance of the judiciary as independent and impartial" cannot "provide justification for the suppression of speech, where such suppression would be held impermissible in elections for other offices."" AndJacintha Webster observes, The election of judges was not something fundamental to the structure of our nation. In fact, at the time of the founding, there were very few, if any, elected judges. Judges were almost always appointed by the executive or legislature. It was not until the Jacksonian Era that people began to elect judges. 9 At that time, the idea was to "ensure that state judges would command more rather than less power and prestige." 90 Perhaps "ideally public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge often is called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment."
98 But no judge is totally independent; independence resides on a continuum.
9 So, as Kang and Shepard write, "[T]he usual problem with elected judges, as critics ofjudicial elections would put it, is not that judges are responsive at all to political incentives, but that they are excessively so."oo It all can be a confounding theoretical debate. Charles Geyh reviewed the available data and found appointing judges to be essential to public acceptance ofjudges who decided cases the public disagreed with. 121 Binder and Maltzman found that the politicization of the confirmation process delegitimized those judges.' 2 2 But Bonneau and Hall, as well as Gibson, concluded that many of the various intuitively troublesome aspects of electing judges do not degrade legitimacy.1 2 3
Nownes and Glennon summarized the work of their predecessors by noting, While previous studies have unquestionably improved our understanding of elections and their effects on judicial legitimacy, we believe that one general question remains under addressed. That question is this: Does the method by which judges acquire their positions affect public perceptions of judicial legitimacy? Though it may seem at first glance that some do, none of the studies we cite above address this precise question directly. Nownes and Glennon concluded that while the public does not trust elected judges, the public trusts appointed judges less: "Does electing state supreme court justices negatively affect levels of diffuse support for the state supreme court? Our findings suggest that the answer to this question is 'No."' 125 In an equally nuanced and complex conclusion, Sara Benesh's work seems to find the opposite:
What kinds of individuals are most and least likely to support the courts in their communities, then? Considering the results of the analysis overall, it seems that a highly educated individual with experience as a juror and a strong understanding of the court system, who has a high level of baseline confidence in the institutions of government, and who lives in a state where judges 120 This all is just a small-albeit representative-fraction of the literature on legitimacy and judicial selection. In the world of legitimacy, accountability, and independence, finding reputable work on both sides of any question is easy. Both theorists and empiricists have studied the issues ad nauseam, and the results are vexing.
III. REINTERPRETING THE DATA ON LEGITIMACY ANDJUDICIAL SELECTION
A. How to Read the Judicial Selection Literature as Consistent Rather than Inconsistent
So how can one explain the seemingly oxymoronic literature on judicial selection methods and legitimacy? One interpretation is that the work is flawed, since it cannot be consistently replicated to support the same conclusion. But an alternative explanation is that the work is exactly correct-what the literature is describing is that all methods of judicial selection are overly politicized in ways that undermine legitimacy.
Alljudges-even appointed, life-tenured judges-can be and are subject to the same sort of implicit biases that one fears might infect nonprofessional decision-makers. judiciary remains independent and free from political pressure-independent from party politics, independent from Congress and independent from the President of the United States himself." 1 6 Obviously, she was concerned the opposite was emerging. Professor Roy Schotland writes, "Vulnerability is obvious for judges facing election."' Judge David Hamilton writes, "We have a nomination and confirmation process that is threatening to become dysfunctional." Politicization undermines legitimacy. Gibson, for example, finds that the legitimacy of courts is undermined by political ads that "portray courts as 'just another political institution,"' and in fact, "research has uncovered some evidence that extremely No. 1I laughing stock," 1 " this relative evaluation seems to stand for little. If objective rather than relativistic judicial legitimacy not only is a laudable goal but also is a central pillar holding up communal civility in a democracy, then something needs to be done. If politics are the problem, then electing judges plainly is not the solution. But simply biasing toward appointment and confirmation rather than elections to select and retain judges apparently is not the answer either. 14 5
The federal judicial nomination and confirmation process does have both a formal and informal merit-selection screening process. The President and the Senate do formal merit reviews. The American Bar Association does an informal review. In recent times, neither seem to count for as much as one would hope.
Consider, for example, the 2017 nomination of Matthew Petersen to be a United States District Court judge. On September 7, 2017, President Trump nominated Mr. Petersen to the federal bench. 1 " He was rated as "qualified" by the American Bar Association. 47 Mr. Petersen's Senate confirmation hearing became a "viral" sensation when he struggled to identify basic litigation terminology.148
Or consider Brett Talley. When nominated, the thirty-sixyear-old Talley had practiced law for three years, had never tried a case, and was rated "unqualified" by the ABA. 149 Multiple presidents have nominated multiple judicial aspirants to the federal bench whom the ABA rated "unqualified."' 53 The point here is not that President Trump is doing so, or that any other president has done so, but that there is simply no consistently, generally agreed upon set of judicial qualifications, even informal, simply by virtue of judges being appointed rather than elected.
Nor does adding the layer of a prenomination, merit-selection commission perforce solve the legitimacy conundrum. The contemporary public face of advocacy for merit selection ofjudges is retired U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Day O'Connor.
5 4 In promotion of an independent, apolitical judiciary, Justice O'Connor promotes widespread adoption of the "Missouri Plan"-the essentials of which are the governor appointing a judge from an aspirant list identified by a nonpartisan commission, with the judge after a period of time thereafter standing for retention election.' 5 5 TheJustice explicitly links merit selection with legitimacy:
The legitimacy of the judicial branch rests entirely on its promise to be fair and impartial. If the public loses faith in that-if they believe that judges are just politicians in robesthen there is no reason to prefer their interpretation of the law 
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or Constitution over the opinions of the real politicians representing the electorate. Judges rely on the other branches of government to enforce our orders. With the executive wielding the power of the sword and the legislature the power of the purse, you could say that courts wield the power of the quill. The judicial power lies in the force of reason and the willingness of others to listen to that reason. After all, a quill is nothing more than a feather that, by itself, is harmless. O'Connor explains that while acceptance of unpopular judicial decisions was not always the case in the United States, it notably is today, and it is this legitimacy-the currency of the courts-that she fears for if politics are not minimized in judicial selection. But some evidence suggests that O'Connor's prenomination merit-selection commission may be at best an imperfect solution. While merit-selected judges may be more independent, they are not perceived as more legitimate.' To the contrary, while a number of states have a variant of the Missouri Plan, the legitimacy of the judiciary continues to erode.
Consider Rhode Island. Common Cause of Rhode Island (CCRI)-the primary lobbyist and architect of Rhode Island's current merit-selection system, a Missouri Plan-recounts that roughly twenty-five years ago the Rhode Island judiciary was to at least some material degree corrupt, and the people knew it.
159
CCRI tried to change the way judges were selected in order to fix the problem, and the Rhode Island Legislature adopted a version of the proposal. Yelnosky concluded that with the exception of slight increases in racial diversity and gender diversity, the only measurable way that merit selection changed who were Rhode Island'sjudges were not meaningful-matters like a change in the prevalence of graduates from Providence College, or the number ofjudges who previously were state employees in some other capacity. 162 Yelnosky further noted that his conclusions were "consistent with most of the literature on the impact of merit selection."'" 6 For example, Bonneau and Hall found that, in fact, Missouri Plan states do not produce a more qualified judiciary than that found in states that have partisan, elected judiciaries." And more to the point, CCRI reports that in Rhode Island the public still does not think highly of the Rhode Island judiciary. 65 Merit selection in and of itself is not a generic, consistent solution to eroding judicial legitimacy--a conclusion in harmony with the conclusions more broadly of some scholars who are deeply critical of the effectiveness of the Missouri Plan approach to judicial selection.' As Michael Dimino writes, "all this effort to marginalize the public has had little effect on the supposed dangers of judicial elections, including the partisan pressures, increased expense, personal invective, and threats to independence posed by recentjudicial elections."' 6 7 Geyh writes, As to the relationship between merit selection and partisanship, critics note that governors do not make apolitical nominations in merit selection states; rather, they typically pick favored partisans from the pool of candidates that the selection commission deems qualified. Merit selection thus does not eliminate the influence of partisanship and interest-group politics from judicial selection, but merely moves it from the point at which judges are elected to the point at which they are appointed. 1 68
C. A Proposed Better Merit-Selection Model
The legitimacy literature is in harmony with the Rhode Island experience, simply opting for appointment and confirmation, appointment from a menu of merit-screened aspirants, or appointment followed by retention elections is not the way to 805 (2004) ("Merit selection hopes to limit the pressure on incumbents to rule in particular ways by ensuring that there will be no candidate opposing the incumbent, and therefore less chance that the public will be alerted to those instances where the judge has flouted the popular will.").
167. Id. at 808 (citations omitted). 168. Geyh, supra note 113, at 56.
depoliticize and thus relegitimize the judiciary. What is failing?
The problem is what Yelnosky and CCRI describe-even a Missouri Plan-style merit-selection commission applies amorphous qualifications criteria, and so the process does not change who emerges as a possible judge. This apparently is not lost on the public at large, and so there is no reason to expect the public to have any more respect for a judge that emerges from a Missouri Plan system than from any other system.
To state the problem, however, is to understand the potential solution, which is to have a very different merit-selection systemone that applies concrete, objective, specific, apolitical qualifications that produce a different set of aspirants-a set that prima afacie is professional, qualified, and not screened on any political criteria.
There is no constitutional barrier to such a system. The Constitution sets forth no requirements to be a judge. 169 The Constitution sets forth requirements to be President. 17 0 The Constitution sets forth requirements to be a Senator. 171 The Founders recognized and robustly debated who was best positioned-between the President and the Senate-to pick a judge.' 2 But the Constitution is silent on who might be qualified to be picked as a judge or what those qualifications could be.
1
There is no legal impediment to saying that in order to be on a ballot, or be on a list of potential appointees, an aspiring judge must emerge from a correctly structured qualification screening.
There are two templates one could look to for such a system. The first is Europe, and the second is the system of administrative judges in the United States.
An example of such a system comes from Europe. The perceived need for neutral, apolitical, independent judges is not a perception unique to the United States. As Professor Mary Volcansek writes, across the globe the question " [w] ho are these judges and how did they attain their powerful positions . . . is asked, not only in the United States, but also in democracies around the world." 174. Volcansek, supra note 3, at 363.
298
Vol. 23
judicial Selection
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden all are examples of judicial selection through a civil-service model."' The hallmarks of such a system-designed to result in an independent, apolitical judiciary-are a separate educational program for aspiring judges, who then enter the judiciary at an entry or internship level based on results of objective, competitive examinations, and then advance internally up the ranks of the judiciary."' That legitimacy concerns are not routinely raised in these nations is itself notable-typically scholars reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of civil-service judiciaries seem to focus on different concerns. 177 But it is not dispositive. The lack of academic recognition of legitimacy concerns in Europe does not establish the absence of the concerns. But it is suggestive, and so in a sense encouraging.
There is a system of courts and "judges" in the United States that already is civil-service selected-Administrative Law Judges There are important differences that exist between the two kinds of judges-administrative and traditional. Typical administrative courts and their judges often differ from typical traditional courts and their judges in that, among other things, No. 1I
administrative courts are organized within specific agencies in order to promote ALJs with appropriate, specific subject-matter expertise, but with the cost that due to agency oversight, ALJs lack independence. 80 As currently constituted, ALJs are not themselves independent. 18 ' But that is an issue of being subject to the direction and employment censure of a broader agency, 182 which is not a feature of Article III judges. As Professor Kent Barnett quips, "ALJs are equal to Article III judges, except for the Article III part." 8 3 Put another way, ALJs are less insulated from politics than Article III judges.'" ALJs perceive that while there are many positives to theirjobs, an overarching negative is that ALJs are in a position that structurally is more politicized than that of a traditional judge.
185
Politics are the enemy of legitimacy. So, there is reason to think that an ALJ-like selection system for traditional judges-in other words, civil-service selected, politically independent-could be the best of both worlds. Which is why it is not surprising that there is at least one writer who argues that a Continental-like judicial selection approach is necessary to the legitimacy of the judiciary in the United States. ' As with the European civil-service system, the example of ALJs is suggestive and encouraging, albeit not necessarily clear. Thomas with legitimacy.' 7 But that intention is a far cry from concluding that the APA succeeded in this goal. There isn't a lot-frankly, almost anything-evaluating the actual legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of ALJs. Perhaps this is because their legitimacy is unquestionable. Or perhaps it is because, as captive agency judges, it is assumed that ALJs are illegitimate. One scholar in administrative law asserts that an ALJs' legitimacy is entirely derivative of whatever legitimacy-or not-that their agency and agency head enjoys. 88 Administrative
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Law Judge Ann Marshall Young makes the case that ALJs are perceived as illegitimate and that the solution, in part, is to try to recapture legitimacy by mimicking the true judicial independence of Article III judges. 18 " But in the end the work simply has not been done yet-we do not know whether ALJs enjoy (or do not) legitimacy, and if so then why.
Where this leaves matters is the intriguing, but as yet only suggestive, possibility that if aspiring traditional judges went through a civil-service-like screening like ALJs and many European judges, then that might, but not necessarily, stem the erosion of judicial legitimacy. But what the empirical work on judicial selection and legitimacy does establish with some clarity is that absent doing something different from what now is being done, traditional judges-whether elected or appointed-are experiencing increasing politicization and decreasing legitimacy.
To summarize, the goal of merit selection is noble, but the weakness is a variant of the conundrum, who watches the watchmen? So long as humans apply subjective factors to decide who is a potential judge, those factors will be applied in ways that reflect the subjective preferences and biases (explicit or implicit) of the decision makers. This is why law school exams are graded blind; this is why auditions for a chair in a symphony orchestra are held behind a screen. An alternative way to interpret the legitimacy literature is to understand it as a call for a judicial selection mythology-a system of screening aspirants that breeds confidence that by definition there is a professional, qualified, apolitical judiciary.'" What might this look like concretely? There are occasional suggestions for improving judicial selection by means other than choosing binomially between election and appointment. Geyh argues for the increased "professionalizing" of the judiciary through increased judicial training, increased judicial continuing education, and the public review of the credentials of any judicial aspirant. 1 Teter proposes a nomination and confirmation process that mimics the process of deciding what military bases to close. 192 Schotland argues for lengthier judicial terms, greater voter education, stricter election regulation, and more aggressive recusal rules. 193 None of these proposals achieve the structure the literature suggests is necessary--an apolitical, specific, intentional, objective merit screening of judicial aspirants that precedes either an electoral or nomination and confirmation consideration.
The focus should be on two process aspects: qualification and assessment. As a starting point, it is embarrassing that more specialized training is necessary to be a barber than to be judge. Perhaps it is unimaginable that the United States comprehensively would create (like some nations in Europe) an entire educational program that currently does not exist-a separate legal training track for aspiring judges. But that is not the only viable training requirement. In the Czech Republic, for example, a law degree is the generic minimum educational requirement, but one still cannot become a judge unless they train for a minimum of three years within the court system. 194 Still too much? Then how about a minimum number of years and experiences before becoming a judge? For example, U.S. Supreme Court Rule 5 provides in part: "To qualify for admission to the Bar of this Court, an applicant must have been admitted to practice in the highest court of a State, Commonwealth, Territory or Possession, or the District of Columbia for a period example of how confidence in process can solve skepticism in individual actors is the story of "The Ceremony" as the method of the private currency, Z-Coin, in addressing perceived problems in the private currency, Bitcoin. Plainly it is within a community's ability to identify a specific set of knowledge and skills necessary to be qualified to be a judge, and to test for it, just as we do for an accountant, a barber, a masseuse, a truck driver, and a nurse.
Further, for each of these fields where testing is a threshold for entry, great attention is paid to the test being objective and to the grading being unbiased. Again, it is not so hard to do.
And there are some unmtuitive upsides of such testing. "Everyone, including every judge, is a conglomerate enterprise whose values and judgments derive from a mysterious jumble of experiences since childhood." 1 96 For example, demographic characteristics of labor arbitrators correlate to arbitration outcomes.' 9 7 But through correctly structured testing, implicit bias can be identified, and so at least through the step of recognition some attempt can be made at amelioration.
Finally, many professions distinguish between its juniors and its seniors. There is no reason that entry into all levels of the judiciary be equivalent. What would be so bad about saying that to be a trial judge one first must be a magistrate or a commissioner; to be an appellate judge one first must be a trial judge; or to be a Supreme CourtJustice one first must be an intermediate appellate judge?
At the risk of sounding trite, this is not rocket science. Process can imbue legitimacy. Perhaps the instinctive trust of doctors derives in part because-due to process requirements-it is really hard to be a doctor, and one has to be quite smart and know a lot 
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No. 1I about medicine in order to be one. This same attention to process can bolster the legitimacy ofjudges.
IV. BUT ... DEMOCRACY? In thinking about a system of governance, democracy and legitimacy were not inevitably values at odds with each other. But arguably they are now.
A threshold question is whether the judicial branch is even intended to be democratic. Robert Dahl details seven "undemocratic elements" in the Constitution. 1 98 But Dahl sees this as a matter of ignorance rather than intention.'" Dahl argues that when the Supreme Court acts as "an unelected legislative body," the Court is invading "the proper province of elected officials." Other scholars would be less troubled. Weingast, for example, argues the Constitution does not treat democracy as its prime directive, but rather must and does counterbalance majority will with antidemocratic structures. 202 It is an interesting theoretical debate, but one the Constitution and the Founders seem to have resolved. Juries are provided three times in the Constitution-through the protections of juries in Article III, Section 2 ("The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury" 20 s), the Sixth Amendment ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" 20 4 ), and the Seventh Amendment ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States" 205 ).
Why are juries so prevalent in the constitutional text? The Founders saw juries as a form of democratic self-governance." irony is that the Founders were most concerned that juries serve as a check on government power. 21 2 Trial courts arguably were considered the most democratic of institutions in the United States. 213 And of course, over time, trial courts became yet more democratic, as judges more frequently were chosen by popular election.
Today, however, juries have all but disappeared.
expression of democracy in the judicial branch is judicial elections. Juries are collateral to the legitimacy ofjudges. But of course, judicial elections are not. So now a democratic judicial function and a legitimate judiciary are at odds. And these are not the only core values in play. As detailed by Shugerman, among many others, judicial elections directly and increasingly undermine judicial independence. 215 The United Nations sees electing judges as a threat to human rights.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights finds, "Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives." 216 The concerned about the fact that in many rural areas justice is administered by unqualified and untrained persons.... The Committee recommends .. . elections be reconsidered with a view to its replacement by a system of appointment on merit by an independent body. 218 The "Covenant" referred to is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14 of which provides in pertinent part, "[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal." 219 and his companies for misleading advertising. 22 3 The issue in front of the Court-one which the Circuit Court declined to review en banc because it was equally divided 22 4 --was whether the Securities and Exchange Commission's use of administrative law judges as hearing officers in administrative proceedings violates constitutional limitations on "Officers of the United States." 225 The Constitution requires officers of the United States to be nominated by the President and confirmed through the Senate's "advice and consent." 2 2 6 The purpose of the clause is to hold such officers "accountable to political force and the will of the people ."
22
The debate in Lucia was whether an SEC ALJ is an officer of the United States. All parties to the case agreed that if an SEC ALJ is an officer, then they must go through the nomination and advice-and-consent process.
2 2 Because, as Freytag explains, that is how the democratic power of the people manifests. 2 29 Or, put another way, all parties agreed that an ALJ hired through the civil-service merit-selection process and acting as a judicial officer would unambiguously meet the Constitution's systemic definition of democracy if the ALJ ultimately is nominated by the President subject to the Senate's advice and consent.
In oral argument the questions of the Justices referenced the need of ALJs to be both independent and accountable. 2 3 0 The
Court held that ALJs are inferior officers and so could not be appointed by staff, but rather only by the President, courts of law, or department heads.
1
Of course, all federal judges are nominated by the President and confirmed subject to the Senate's advice and consent. In other words, the proposal of this Article-a civil-service-like meritselection screening of judicial aspirants who, once hired, then would promote from within-does not offend the Constitution's vision of democracy so long as the initial hiring decision from the list of qualifying aspirants is made by elected public officials. 3 2 V. CONCLUSION This Article started with the example of Judge Aaron Perskya well-educated jurist who certainly would have emerged from any merit-selection screening system. The example of Aaron Persky is both direct and allegorical.
Judge Persky may, by way of direct object lesson, seem to undermine the thesis that carefully structured judicial meritselection systems can promote judicial legitimacy. But one also could posit that the experience of Judge Persky actually bolsters the thesis. A judiciary with legitimacy insulates all judges in the system. Ajudiciary without legitimacy exposes all judges. The issue neither is whether the judge actually is qualified nor is whether the judge made the right decision, but how instinctively emboldened or reticent the public is to try to remove any judge who rules in a way the public disagrees with. This points to the allegorical lesson. Geyh writes, When it comes to judicial elections staking out strident positions at the poles is entertaining and comparatively easy. It is not, however, especially productive when selection systems are broken but sweeping reform is infeasible. During. such times, tabling overstated, all-or-nothing arguments in favor of incremental reform that can make bad situations better is the preferable approach." ' No matter what one's personal view on Judge Persky, the outcome is vaguely unsatisfactory. The questions posited about him at the start of this Article do and will linger unresolved. So too is the attempt to fashion a clean and wholly satisfactory system to have an independent, accountable, and legitimate judiciary. But that does not make the effort fruitless.
232. Academics and other political and legal theorists may (at least some certainly would) virulently dispute that this is adequate democracy.
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